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PLEAD)INGS.
THEI R HIST ORY -
COMPARISON .OF THE 0Oiv0iON LAW AND CODE SYSTEMS
TECHICALITIES OF THE CODE -
PRESENITED FOR THE DEGREE
OF
MASTER OF LAWS
June 189 5
CHARLES BLIVEN MASON.
We can shut our eyes to. teearliest history of society when
a wrong was redressed by the physical force of the injured party or one
of his retainers, and open them again on that age whien a legal wrong
was followed by the application of a legal remedy.
These substantive rights of life, limib, property, etc., were
rights which were respected before the statutes of the different na-
tions proclaimed that fact, for these rights rested in good common
sense. As the world became more enlightened and the chiefs of the
many wandering tribes began to realize their influence, they settled
4own and commenced to repress these broils and battles which were per-
sonally undertaken to redress an injury, or as we would now say- to
punis!i a man for taking the law in his own hands. This was a little
better than the previous stage, as in that it was a nurlber, while here,
one - the soverign, who invoked that arbitrary power or sway.
Still in the case of the soverign, he was restrained by some
poli.tical power, and this tended to prepare the way for the time when
the courts held sway and private redress should be done away with and
replaced by the remedial power of the judicial system.
To carry out these powers, an officer at every stage of the
proceedings is required. It is the bailiff who serves the "writ" or
"sumnmons;" it is the sheriff who seizes th~e property, or perhaps takes
into custody the person; the clerk who ten'3s to the records; the law-
2yers who defend and prosecute; and the judge-, who listens to the argu-
ments and after careful analysis, renders his decision. It has been
said "Remedial law is theo machinery of the substantive," and this ma-
chinery is put in to motion Ly the issuance of this "process," "writ"
or "surnons," which notifys defendant of some wrong which he (plaintiff
has suffered at his hands. Whe the defendant answers this charge
and by subsequent allegations and denials the disputed point has been
reached, issue is joined. These allegations and denials are the
pleadings in the case. Of course after the pleadings are all in, the
verdict or decision is rendered, and this verdict or decision is then
carried into effect by the issuance of the execution, which is supposed
to do justice to the parties concerned.
There are two main systems of pleading, known as the CoTmon
Law or Civil pleading and that practiced under trte code, while a number
of jurisdictions have seen fit to combine some features of both these
systems.
That system of pleading used under the Common Law, of course
claims England as its birthplace, anno although the State of New York is
considered the mother of the code, still it must not be lost sight of
that Justinian arnd other early legal celebrities of Rome and France
have put together codes that are a~s ancient, and you might say, have
existed contemporaneously with the Comrion Law'. However true this may
be, we will <irst examine the Conrmon Law system as it has existed in
3England and this country, and show how, from its many defects, dissatis
faction has arisen, which lead to this revolution in pleading and the
establishment of the code.
To use the words from Heard's text-book on the subject, P.6,
"Pleading is a series of alternate assertions and denials by the plain-
tiff and defendant of their respective grounds of action and defense;
all superfluous and irrelevant matter being thrown off at each stage of
this exhaustive process, till the exact point of difference,- the very
apple of discord - is developed and disclosed." Anci when this "exact
point of difference - this very apple of discord" is reached, this is
the point to be tried, and whether it be one of law or one of fact, the
parties are then said to be at issue. If this disputed point be one
as to fact, a body of laymen - usually twelve in number - listen to the
evidence of the various witnesses and render their verdict accordingly;
or if the point be one of law, a judge, skilled in the nicities of le-
gal learning, renders his decision as he thinks the argument warranted.
And, as has before been said, the function of pleading is to so sift
the needless matter that the exact point in issue may be given to the
judge or jury for decision.
A Cormon Law action is begun by the serving of a "writ" on
the defendant, warning him that A i s about to sue; and the defendant
politely tells him to go ahead and he wJill defend. The plaintiff then
begins his proceedings in a legal form - his case. I wll! say here,
that in the earliest history ofpleadings it has bren shown that these
4various steps were submitted orally, and as there were no clerks who
took minutes of the proceedings, the jttdge based his decision on what
he remembered. From this one might infer that the bench of that time
paid closer attention and did not try to regain their lost sleep during
a session of the court. When the defendant has received this declara-
tion of the plainti_.f he may do any one of six things:
I He may admit everything contained in declaration.
II Enter a plea of abatement.
III Demur.
IV Plead the general issue.
V Admit part of the declaration and deny other parts, and
contend the admitted parts do not give cause for remedy.
VI he may confess and avoid the declaration.
If he admits or fails to act the court awards damiages to the
plaintiff. "A plea in abatement, without adm: itting or denying the
cause of action, sets u* some matter of fact, the legal effect of which
is to preclude the plaintiff fro-,- recovering upon the writ and declara-
tion as at present framked." (Heard P51)
A demurrer means that the objecting party will not proceed
with the pleading because no sufficient statement has been made on the
other side, Lut will wait the judgment of the court whether he is bound
to answer. A demurrer may be either as to substance or form. A de-
murrer is either geea or spcil the former is usually used where
it is as to a matter of substance; but a special demurrer is necessary
where it is as to form. A demurrer always produces as issue off law to
be sent before a judge; but by demurring he admits all the facts.
5But if this declaration be good in law he cannot demur, but may deny
everything alleged. This is pleading the general issue and the ques-
tion is innediately sent to the jury. When he is not pleading the gen
eral issue, he is said to plead specially, and the remaining two (5 & 6)
a
are of this class. That of denying part and admitting part is so lit-
tle different from that of the general issue we will not discuss it.
The plea of confession and avoidance,as its name imports,
confesses all the declaration of the plaintiff but brings in newmatter
to avoid being recovered against. It is easily seen that it raises no
dispute but is something after the Yankee style of answering a question
by asking another. It thus makes the defendant the aggressor, and
both plaintiff and defendant may successively assume this role until
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some definite disputed question is reached. Either one of the first
five pleas produces an issue, and that of confcssion and avoidance is
the only one that postpones it. In theory this could go on indefinite-
ly, but the point in issue is reached sooner or later. Plaintiff's
pleadings are the declaration, replication, surrejoinder and surrebut-
ter. The defendant's are the plea or bar, the rejoinder and rebutter.
A certain time is allowed between the pleadings. When the point in
issue is reached the plaintiff submits a copy of the t h
judge for his guidance, arnd the d~ecision and judgment follow¢s.
we vill now venture sorre idea of the history and growth of
these pleadings from the Saxons up to the present time. We are much
6indebted to the admirable thesis of Mr. S. S. Slater of tne Law Class
of '94, for the historical research, for many of" the illustrative exam-
ples and quotations from prominent jurists and writers, w hich he has
therein collected, and which we have taken the liberty of appropriating.
As has been said before, in the early Saxon period tfese
pleadings were oral and each litige.nt had to appear and plead for him-
self, but after the Conquest, in the time of Granville .(1185) he could,
after getting into court, appoint some one to appear for him. The
practice then, as it is at the present day, in all systems, was that
this attorney could be dismissed if the client thought his cause was
not receiving the attention it required and deserved. It is said that
these pleadings were all made upon oath, thus forming a contrast to
modern pleading, which need not be sworn to, although in practice they
are so verified.
The Saxon was the first tongue used in pleadings, but as the
conquest approached and the clergy had becone a powerful factor in the
nation, Latin was probably used. (Se2lon 64) After William the Con-
queror had won the battle of Hastings and firmly established himself on
the thron1 of England, surrounded by the Norman nobility, along with
his other substitutions of French for Saxon customs, he naturally ;l-
tered the language of the pleadings, changing them from the Latin into
the French. This continued to be the language until the year 1363,
when it was enacted during the reign of Edward III that they be argued
7in English and enrolled in Latin. Cromwell put both the argument and
enrolImeftt into English, but this act or enrollment was subsequently
required to be in the Latin language.
Some years before 1272 the simple Saxon pleadings began to
take on more technical forms and these technicalities began to exist
apparently for the benefit of defendants. "When defendant appeared he
might adjourn himself several times, then protest that the manner of
the service of the writ was bad; if overruled in this he might use
innumerable exceptions to the writ itself............There were ex-
ceptions applicable to all actions, and in addition each action had
exception of its own. Even the mere calling a man Henry when the
nane William was intended; misspel]ing, a proper name; a mistake in
weight, measure, color or the like, are some of the technical defects
which invalidated writs." (II Bracton 213 - 219)
These mere formal technicalities of the Saxon period had be-
gun to be done away with and as we approach the years when Edward I,
sometimes known as the Etnglish Justinian, occupied the throne of En-
gland, we begin to notice the gradual advance this science has made.
Stephen in his note 38 says that it was in the reign of Edward I
(1272 - 1307) that pleading was first methodically i and treated as
a science. During the reign of Edward II the pleadingswere oral and
the judge would interrupt and make oral corrections, and when either
attorney thought he was on safe ground he would3 rest his case.
8Lord Coke once said, referring to the reign of Edward III
(1327- 1.37) that "in this reign pleading grew to perfection." It
was also at this time that the declaration and subsequent pleadings
were beginning to ,be written. This age of "perfect" pleading did not
survive very long, for the art began to degenerate so that the judicial
mind began to prescribe rules which would restore it to its former con-
dition. The rules that "All pleadings should be single in "heir alle-
gations; that tney should be consistent with each other; that each
must aim for the issue; that facts mnust be pleaded and not evidence,"
are matters which are familiar to all students of "Civil Pleading."
By following these rules and different constructions of them by the
bench and profession, the system was made about as subtle as it was in
the first place. The following is an example of a plea of this age,
to use Mr. Slater's own words:
"When a man pleaded that plaintiff's house was not burnt by
his negligence, he was met by the stupid quibble that this might mearn
that the house was not burnt at all." So in the senseless jargon of
the age it was a "negative pregnant with an affirmative." (2 Reeves,
Note B 219).
It is said that during this reign of Edward III that the
least mistake of a clerk who ma~de out the process, either in writing a
syllable or a letter too much or too little in the record, was suffi-
cient to make the proc~edings null and void, and, as before stated, a
9number of statutes were passed to got rid of thtese subtleties,-
twelve in all.
From the time of lRichard II through the reign of Henry VIII
(1377 - 1547) the pleadings began to he intricate and formal, and not
simple and brief as in the early "axon times. And it is said that
during the years wten Henry VIII sat upon the throne, that the plead-
ings became so complex and &bscure that they only served to retard jus-
tice rather than aid it. The technicalities of the 16th and 17th
centuries were so many and the use of these pleadings so intricate,
that the ordinary advocate was not capable of obtaining a hearing, and
only a fewwere fully enough acquainted with the subtleties to accom-
plish any sort of success.
An article entitled "The Art of Modern Pleading" published
in the 12th Volume of the Law Journal P 674 is interesting, as showing
how these rules as framed by the courts and legislaturefailed in their
object and the ;vays in Which the practitioner got around them. As to
the rule that pleadings must be single, the author says: "As far as
the plaintiffs were concerned this rule was easily evaded in this way:
Although a plaintiff was not alloved to 8upport one claim on two grounds
he w'as allowed to join two or more claims in one declaration, ha.ving a
separate count for each. He woulA surmise therefore, that he sued on
two bills of exchange and say as to one bill, he presented it; as to
the other, that the defendant exhonerated him prom presenting it. At
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trial of course he only proved one bill, but he applied that to which
ever count he could support by evidence, and as to the other count he
failed."
Althoug. the Act of the British Parliament of 1852 made an
end of te substance of the rule against duplicity, the form has con-
tinued. "The other feature of pleading is, that instead of the actual
facts being stated, the lega. results or implications from them are
stated as facts." "As for instance, the defendant is said to break and
enter the plaintiff's if he gives a warrant to distrain to a
broker who enters for that purpose. So if a man turns his wife out of
doors and without means of support, goods supplied to her are said to
be sold and delivered to him, because she had an implied authority to
bind him." After giving nturerous other specific examples, he contin-
ues: bI will no.,-point out the mischiefs resulting from this last
mentioned mratter. In the first place it causes pleading to fail in
their very objects. They do not state facts so as to inform the oppo-
site party nor evolve thte matter in dispute. It is said that the form-
er objection is removed by giving particulars, but the proper object of
part iculars is to particularize, not to state facts. But the latter
I
objection remains in full force. The pleadings do not evolve what *~
in dispute as matter of fact or matter of law." The rem~ainder of the
discussion is the pointing out of the frailties and v'ieaknesses of the
Commnon Law system, and how these could be remedied bY" the Code Proced-
ure.
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Writers on this subject, and even those who are adherents to
Conmon Law pleading, are free in saying tiiat this system, more than any
other, affords a means for chicanery and fraud. It was Lord Mansfield
who said that there were very few lawyers who knew its subtleties, and
where triey were not known, wvere used as instruments of chicane. From
a perusal of the previous pages it is readily seen that more attention
was given to the forno than the substance of the pleading. The fol-
lowing words taken from the opinion in the case of Forsyth vs Wells 41
P. St. 291, express the present idea of pleadings: "We may not sacri-
fice the principle to the very form by which we are endeavoring to en-
force it. Principles can never be realized without forms, and they
are often inevitably embarassed by unfitting ones; but still the fact
thatthe form is for the sake of the principles, and not the principles
for the form, require that the form shall serve, not rule, the princi-
ple, and must be adapted to its office."
We have thus seen that the Spring of Justice was often clog-
ged at its very source, and then it was only by hard digging or a lucky
leak through the obstruction that the question could emerge into this
stream of litigation and a decision reached.
Lord Hale thus concisely stated the condition of pleading at
its various stages: -- Originally, pleadings werevery plain and con-
cise, but in progress of time, pleaders, yea and judges too, became too
curious in them, so that the art and dexterity of pleading which in its
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use, nAture and design was. only to render the fact plain and intelligi-
ble and to bring the matter to judgment with convenient certainty, be-
gan to degenetate from its primitive simplicity and true use and end in
a piece of nicety and curiousity, vrhich how it hath improved therein in
later times, the length of the pleadings, the many unnecessary repeti-
tions and the many miscarriages of causes upon small arnd trivial ob-
jections, do but too sufficiently testify."
In the reign of Henry VIII and down through the succeeding
ones to the present day, statutes have been passed which have to some
extent modified these pleadings, by striking out some an creating fic-
tions to get around others. Also the courts have had some hand in re-
fonning the pleadings, as for example,- doing away with all formal mat-
ters. During the middle of this century when the English government
was trying in this way to smooth over the rough surface of her pleading
system, New York applied the treatment which might be likened to the
use of the knife by the surgeon, and cuts away the entire diseased mem-
ber, and puts in its place one thiat can perform its functions in a bet-
ter manner. The result of this operation was the doing away with the
Con mton Law system of pl eading and the establishment of the Code of Civ-
iI Procedure. As a result of this reform in New York, England greatly
modified her system of pleadings in the year 18"/3 by the passage of the
Judicature Act.
It is a fact well known to all students of the law that when
the early settlers of New York State sawa fit to establish a government
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and judicial system, they adopted such laws and rules of the mother
country as would fit the tei perament and surroundings of te infant
state; and so the same net work of intricate forms which had been
bothering the bench and hampering justice in Merry England, were nec-
essarily introduced into the courts of the Empire 2tate. Nor were the
evils which had accompanied them in the Old World discarded when the
system was introduced in the New. The same distinction between law
and equity here existed, the sa:ne objectionable forms were used and the
same unsatisfactory results wiere obtained. Althouf.h but an infant,
New Yom, was very precocious and ier men of thought axd action could n
long endure these evils wYithout some atter.pt to rei:cdy them. Expres-
sions of I.ssatis f -,ct0t2O Wore heard on J .ides athese fee.ings
-v.o- x ,:,c tu action. Experience has sh.own anrd history as demonstra-
ted that with an increase of industry wh-ere competitors are many, all
eager to get to the front, they can't but help infringing on each oth-
ers rights, consequently causing much litigation. This was the condi-
tion of New _ork in the early years of this century, the courts being
crowded witht suitors who seemed unable to get a hearing. The legisla-
tures made amendments to facilitate the hearing of causes and in 1823
a new constitution went into effect. This w.as thought to have reme-
died the previously existing defects, but in about two years this new
constitution was deemed as bad as the old. It was about this time
that David Dudley Field camue into the arena of public notice as a chain-
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pion of Code Procedure. In 1847 a new constitution, which had been
asked for by the people, was adopted, and during al' this time Mr.
Field had not been idle. In many phamplets bie had urged the adoption
of his hobby. He stated his proposed reform in the folloiing language:
"It is proposed that the complaint (the declaration) shall
set forth briefly, in ordinary language, and without repetition, the
nature and particulars of the cause of action; and that the plaintiff
or his attorney shall make oath to his belief of its truth. To this,
the defendant is to put in his answer, setting forth briefly, and in or
dinary language, and without repetition, the nature and particulars of
his defense, to be verified in the same way." He proposed an amalga-
mation of procedure in suits in law and in equity. Speaking of these
two early systems of pleading he said - "The distinction between the
two classes of cases is now merely a distinction in the forms of pro-
ceeding. The Court of Chancery has existed only in consequence of the
narrov and fixed forms of the conmon law. If those forms had been
abolished and natural procedure adopted, the course of the two courts
would long ago have been assimilated." "The Common Law prohibits the
assig"nent o4 a thing in action. Equity allows it. The courts of
law require te suMto be brought in the name of the assignor but they
try to protect the assignee and if they sue in equity in the name of
the assignee, he is thrown out of court. "This," asFed"sgo
law but the reason is bad," and the sooner the distinction between
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these courts in a case of this kind is made, that the suit can be in-
stituted in the namr-ie of the real party in interest, the better it will
be for the cause of justice.,Somewhere in his ,any tracts he discuss
ed the difficulty of fixing in all cases the limits of the respective
jurisdictions of Law and iquity, .,ind of the frequent necessity of going
through both courts to determine one controversy," and cited as illus-
trative the well known New York Assesslent cases. The legislature was
finally persuaded to appoint a com-!mittee whose duty it was to provide
for the abolition of the present forms of action and pleading; for a
uniform course or" proceedings in all cases, whether of legal or equit-
able cognizance; and for the abandonment of every form and proceeding
not necess,;ry to ascertain or preserve the rights of the parties.
These directions to the committee, composed of seventy-three
able lawyers, contained the sentiments of Field himself. But although
Field had been chamapioning the cause, he was not at first named as one
of the cormmittee. Mr. Nicholas Hll of Albany, one of three, not able
to agree with his two associates, resigned, and Mr. Field was appointed
to fill the vacancy. Heenthused new spitit into the undertaking and
at the close o' the year 1849, a little over eighteen months of work,
the committee had completed their labors.
The way in which the new code w',as received by the people and
especially by the representatives of the bar, is w.ell shown by the
words of ivir. Field (7 Alb. L.J. 193)
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"The new system was a complete overthrow of the old. Noth-
ing of the kind hadever before been atte.1pted. It shocked the theories
and prejudices of thte profession, hardened by the incrustation of cen-
turies. No wonder that it was received with amazement at the audacity
of proposing it, with scorn for tre re Lsoning with which it was support
ed, and with hate for its destruction of the learning of so rany life-
times. No wonder that lawyers scoffed at it and judges rebuked it...
We boast justly that we have inherited from our fathers that English
S
law which proclaims and enforces the rights of men. Let us give our-
selves cause to boast also that we have enriched the great inheritance "
And further lauding Hew York as tle pioneer in this movement, he closes
with these words: "She struck the blow that broke in pieces the un-
natural, cumberous and oppressive procedure which had hardened through
ages."
Field throughout his life did not allow modesty prevent him
from taking thie most of the credit of this reform, and he opposed as
best he could, every effort of th.e legislature to alter his code in any
way. It was openly proclined at a session of the New York Bar Asso-
ciation, thatevery movement was hostile to a reconstruction of the
code by Thrmop, tnd although he cl.aimed to be a friend of the reform,
he was in fact its enemy. Passing by these personal d isputes, it is
sufficient to say that J hroop did reform the code, being the one now in
use; o " course, altered by the amendments w;hich have taken place from
year to year.
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In the preceding pages, the history of thie Common Law and Cod
pleading we think has been substantially given. The defects which the
code has sought to rem-edy have been touched upon and we will now pass
to a closer study of those sections of the code wh-ichi relate to plead-
ings. WVe will. not pretend to treat these sections in a logical manner
but will take them up in the order they come.
Pleadings, vhether underthe.Code or COmnon Law system are de-
fined as the formal written allegations of the parties of their respect
ive claims and defenses, -:d their object is to make known to the court
the real matter in controversy, to apprise each party of the grounds of
claim or defense put forward by the other, and to make apparent by the
record wirhat controversy has been litigated and concluded by the judg-
ment in the action. It is needless to say that pleadingsshould be in
writing, subscribed by the party or attorney, and then 2iled. Wile
the codes expressly abrogate the formalities of the older systems of
pleading and the rules by which their sufficiSncy is determined, the
objects and essential principles are the same in all. systems." The
code has abolished "fictions" and provided a uniform system. C0ommon
law rules of pleading are abrogated and 1chere they are applied under
the code system, it is because they are expressly enacted or necessari-
ly implied from the language of the statute. Bryant in his ;rork on
Code Plea ding says,- "From many decisions under the code, referring to
and following the old rules of pleading, it might be inferredthat they
are still in force; but when r ollowed it is because they inhere in the
18
new system, not that they are in force as the old rules."
Chapter VI of the N. Y. Code is devoted to Pleaiings in
Courts of Record. This chapter is divided into two titles; the first
namingand explaining the consecutive pleadings in an action, while the
second pertains to provisions generally applicable to pleadings. The
pleadings under the code are the (1) cot.p--,.int, (2) demurrer, (3) ans-
wer, (4) reply, whether it be in New York or any other state having the
sane system. To usethe words of the first section (478) of this chap-
ter - "The first pleading on the part of the plaintiff is the ?omplaint
although in some states it is known as the petition. It corresponds
,to the declaration of Cormon Law and to the "bil"in Equity. Sections
479-80 direct when a copy of the complaint is to be served and what the
consequence of a failure to do so would be. Then follows 481, and
states what the complaint is to contain. It has been held that if no
court isz named in the stumons or complaint it is e: nullity (Ward vs
Stringham C.R. 18), but that iu inserted in the sunm. ons, its omission
in the complaint would be disregarded. (9 How. 198). The names of the
parties must bestated, and in what capacity, whether as individuals,
partners, or as a corporation. (2) It must contain "a plain and con-
cise statement of the facts, constituting each cause of action, without
unnecessary repetition." This means plain English language, .avoiding
all superfluous and redundant allegations, and stating only those facts
that are material. Miany of the mirnuter rules of qommnon L~zw E-leading
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are applicable to that of the code, as (a) State the facts, not the
evidence of the facts. (b) State facts, not mere conclusions of law,
althou.<h the codes permit conclusions of law to be alleged ina few in-
stances. (c) Do not state facts which are necessarily implied. (d)Do
not state facts of which the court takes judicial notice, and as to
matters of which the court takes judicial notice, consult works of
evidence. (e) State facts as they occurred, rather than according to
their legal effect, although many authorities under the code say it is
proper to state ther this way. (f) Pleadings should not be double.
Duplicity under the code is the jumbling of two or more causes of act-
Aion or defenses into one account or statement. (g) Do not anticipate
defenses. This was allowed in Equity, but forbidden by the Common Law
Then there are the numerous rules tending to certainty of issue, those
tending to prevent obscurity, confusion and prolixity. At Common Law
the declaration must " lay damages" and under the Code it is also nec-
essary to allege them. The complaint must contain a demand ofthe judg-
ment to whfqich the plaintiff supposes himself entitled. If a recovery
of money be demanded, the amount thereof shall be stated. This demand
should be explicit and is usually for money only. It may be a demand
for alternative relief, or for two kinds, but they must be consistent
with each other. And even in an aoction of equitable character, thle
court wrill give the full relief to wJhich the facts alleged and the case
entitle the plaintiff, though the relief may be of a legal nature.
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Section 484 specifies what causes of action may be united in
the same complaint, and the decisions under it are many. Teall vs
City or' 3yracuse 32 un. 332 held that an action for wrongfully con-
verting property by means o a wronr.ful seizure -nd sale thereof could
not be united in the sam!te complaint with one for the proceeds of the
sale of the property. The case of Laming vs (Ualusha 135 N.Y. 239,
decides that an equitable action for an injunction and one for personal
injuries arising out of the same transaction, i.e., the keeping of a
boiler and engine in front ofhis premises, can be united in the same ,
complaint, We will not take the time or space to go over the various
decisions under this section but will pass to a discussion of the next
pleading - the demurrer.
The dem:)urrer admnits the facts to be true, but under the code
system only for the purpose of testing their legal sufficiency, but
claims they are insufficient in law. The scope of the demurrer of the
code is somewhat different than that of the colmon law system. It
reaches to objections,to jurisdiction, to disabilities of person and to
defect of parties, which are Tiet at coimmon law and in equity pleading
by pleas in abatement. This, or the answer, is the only pleading on
the part of the defendant and section 488 of the code lays down eight
objections in a complaint that may be demurred to. But in case the
defendant sets up a counter claim or a defense consisting of new mat-
ter, the plaintiff may demur to it if on its face it is insufficient in
law- (P 494)
21
Section 495 gives the grounds on v"hich the plaintiff can
demur to a counterclaim of defendant. It may be well to say here that
the special demurrer for imformality is abrogated, and mnany defects of
a pleading which were formerly ground for special demurrer at law, or
,exception in equity, are, by the codes, reached by motion to make more
Idefinite and certain, or to strike out, or they are disregarded. It
is well to bear in mind the following fundamental rules when demurring
under the code:
(1) The demurrer may be to the wlhole complaint or to any one
or more of the several causes of action stated therein, but if it is
made to the wholo pleading it will be overruled, if any o. the causes
of action therein are good. (2) It must reach the whole of a cause of
Kction. (3) W here two or more defendants jointly demur, the demurrer
is bad if a cause of action is stated against any one of them, though
not against all. (4) The dernurrant cannot answer and demur to the
same matter. (5) The demurrer adm1its the facts. (6).The demurrer
reaches back to the first fault, i * e., upon the argument of the demur-
#rer the court will exanine the whole record or series of pleadings and
give judgrment against the party who was f'irst defective in his pleading
If the defendant can 0ind no grounds under the code by which
he can demuur, he must "answer." This pleading takes the place of the
common law "plea" and of thle "answer" in the equity system, but it goes
farther than either of these in that it permits the defendant to set up
or plead a "counterclaim," i.e, an independent cause of action exist,PC la a"outrcam, .
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ing in. his own favor against the plaintiff, by which to diminish, bal-
ance off, or exceed tne plaintiff's cause of action, and thereby show
hi self entitled to affirmative relief. Sections 500-1 provide what
the answer shall contain, and contrary to the old system the, defendant
may plead several defenses or counterclaims. The denial may beeither
general or specific, and there are many rules by Which the defendant
should be guided in fraYiing them. The test proposition whether a
counterclaim will be sufficient to be sustained or not, is whether it
could have been instituted as a separate cautse of action. The follow-
ing cases will give some idea of what the courts consider valid counter
claims and what they do not: In O'Brien vs Garniss 25 Hun. 446, the
action was for the construction of a will and the validity of the trust
under which the defendant assumed to act. The counterclaim sought to
establish the trust and compel an accounting of the money, which as
devisee, under the will, the plaintiff had collected fron the trust
estate. This was held a good counter-claim. In the case of Barnes
vs Gilmore 6 Civ. Pro. Rep. 286, the question as to a mortgage was in-
volved, and the defendant set up as a counter-claim an amount of rent
due when he held under the deed of such property, and it was deemed a
good counter-claim. UJnder the following circumstances the counter-
claim was considered sufficiernt:- An action was brought to foreclose
a mortgage nd the defendant demanded affirmative relief by way of its
foreclosure and a sale of the premises arid property covered by it. In
this alleged claim of the defendant he erribraced both a cause of action
against te plaintiff and against his co-defendant. (Met. Trust Co. vs
R. R. Co. 43 Hun. 521). The case of Driscoll vs Sanderson 15 N. Yo
State Rep. 134, furnishes an example of a counter-clati tt was not
considered sufficient. Plaintiff sued for commissions and defendant
set up against it that the plaintiff had misrepresented some Brooklyn
property which she had exchanged for other land, situated inr Scranton,
Pa. It was not alleged however in the answer that the property ex-
changed by her for the Brooklyn lots was the -ame property or any part
of it referred to in the complaint, neither was it stated that this ex-
change of property was in any way connected with the transactions in the
complaint; neither was it stated that the plaintiff had violated any
contract with the defendant and as his action was wholly on contract
the effect of tie omission of these allegations was to excludehher
claim as a counter-claim in the action. Lirunan vs Iron Works 128 N.Y.
I
58, in which Judge Fvnch delivers the opinion, and Rothschild vs Whit-
man 132 N.Y. 148, are two Court of Appeal cases in which the counter-
claims were considered bad. The case of iMaders vs Lawrence 49 Hun.
360, prrsents a statement of facts in which two men traded horses and
the defendant gave his promissory note for the difference in the value
of the two and the plaintiff now brings an action on this note, and de-
fendant sets up a breach of warranty and the court held that as the
giving of the promissorynote constituted but part of the transaction
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the breach of warranty was rightfully pleaded, but by way of dicta they
say it w-oulmd have been different if the defendant had commenced an
action based upon the warranty, for as six years had elapsed the stat-
ute of limitations would have boen a bar.
Tbte next pleading in order is the "reply" and except in a few
code states where it is not embraced in the series of pleadings it is
necessary to be used on the part of the plaintiff when the answer sets
up a counter-claim, properly pleaded, and unless this counter-claim is
replied to, it is admitted. This reply must be consistent with the
allegations of his complaint, Section 514 of the code is the begin-
ning of the article devoted to the reply and under this section it has
been decided tnat a reply which denies the allegations of the counter-
claim, does not by setting up new matter in avoidance of it, admit
those allegations. The case of Jordan vs Bank 74 N.Y. 467, holds that
when an answer sets uW a counter-claim to which there is no reply, but
the trial of the action proceeds as if every matter contested by the
parties was at issue, and no point is raised that the counter-claim is
admitted, it cannot be taken on appeal. An unnecessary reply will be
stricken out on motion of the defendant. Dillon vs R. R. 14 J. & S.
21, Devlin vs Bevins 22 Howard 290, Gilbert vs Cram 12 How. 455. This
first citation is also authority for saying sections 516 and 517 should
be construed togeth er. A reply to an amended answer is rnot necessary
where the orliginal answer has been replied to, and the amended answer
Bets up no new issuable facts requiring a reply. Leslis vs Leslis
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The following cases are illustrative of the instances in whici
the court has or has not directed the plaintiff to reply to the new
matter woiich is set up constituting a defense by way of ,avoidance. I
the case of HiLLell vs Fowler 1 Abt. (fl.S. ) I, an answer had been put
in interposing the statute of limitations and a reply thereto was or-
dered. It ,il-l be perceived that the defense admitted the plaintiff's
cauise of action, but souaht to avoid the same by reason of the statute.
In the case of Brinckerhoff vs Brinckerhoff 8 Abbt. N. Cases 207, the
action was for dower, and the defendant alleged that the deceased had
been divorced from the plaintiff. The plaintiff was then ordered to
reply, because it was quite apparent that the de 'endant was entitled
to be appraised of the way in which tnhe plaintiff proposed to avoid and
overconoe the decree of divorce. Poilon vs Lawrence 77 N.Y. 207,
arose on an answer pleading a discharge in bankruptcy.
This ends our discussion of the different pleariings which iay
arise in an action under the code, and we are as fully aware of its
shortcomings as is the reader. We can simply say that these pages
convey but vaguely the amount of work undergone in their preparation.
Vhe second title of Chapter VI contains the remaining proviS-
ions of the code applicable to pleadings. The section.; included (5l
-546) have been the subject of much litigation, and the courts Loth
high and low have given them a construction. "This chapter prescribes
the form or pleadings in an action, and the rules by which the suffi-
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cieTicy thereof is determined, except where special provision is other-
wise made by law." The rules of "proiert and oyer" have no longer any
application, and other technicalities of the old system are abrogated.
Sections 7i5-76 are in relation to pleadings where one of t.ie parties
is a corporation; we will not however, enter into a discussion of them.
All these pleadings must be liberally construed with a view to sulbstan-
tial justice between the parties, and this applies only to matters of
form. (00lark vs Dillon 97 N.Y. 370). See also 81Bl N.Y. 296, 88 N.Y.
37, 7 N.Y. 476, and other citations of the annotated codes, and one can
arrive at the idea the courts have of liberality o.. construction.
It has be.en ofttimes decided that dates are l'exible in
pleading and variances may Le disregarded, except perhaps in divorce.
ISchiller vs iviallbie 11 Civ. Pro. Rep. 304, decides that both the sub-
-acription and tne indorsement of an attorney are required, and neither
alone is sufficient. In the case of Durham vs Lee 47 N.Y. Sup. t.
174, section 521 was involved and t ie court said: "Tese sections
(521 and 1204) are not to be limitcd by mere construction to actions
of foreclosure, partition, and similar actions of a purely equitable
character, for the great feature of that code is, that but a single
form of action is provided for the enforcev.ient of all private rights,
and that a defendant may set ftorth in his answer, as ,-,ny defenses or
counter-claims, or both, as he has, whether they are such as were for-
merly deno inated legal or equitable." Under! 523 it was held that a
want of a verif'ication to a complaint constituted no objection as it
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was not "a subsequent pleading" within the meaning of the section.
Judge Fr~ch delivered the opinion in the case of Rogers vs Decker 131
N.Y. 490, where it was held that an action to enforce the liability of
a trustee was not a penal action and so the defendant was not excused
from putting in a verified answer where the coiplaint was verified.
In regard to p524 Judge Andrews in the case of Bennett vs M I'f'g Co.
110 N.Y. 152, uses the following language: "It assumes that when a
party has no personal knowledge an averment or denial may Le made upon
information and belief, and treats every positive averment or denial
as having been made on personal knowledge, and declares in substance
that it is to be so regarded in criminal prosecutions."
Under P525 an attorney of a corporation has been held to be
an officer thereof, capable of verifying (133 N.Y. 270) and also a
"general Tmanager" whose duties are not specified can also verify. (15
Civ. Pro. Rep. 259), but the same decision is authority for saying that
an ex-officer is not an officer oVf the corporation with the meaning of
the section. The phrase, "knows the contents thereof and that tne
same are true" held equal to saying that they are true to the knowledge
of deponent, and so is a substantial compliance with 526 (94 N.Y. 574).
"The object of requiring notice (says the court in ?antz vs Kuhn 9 Daly
166) is to enable the party in default to apply for leave to supply the
omission." This was decided in connection with 528. Section 529 is
aimed solely at fraudulent transfers and the like, but in other actions
in which the defendant is charged with crimes or misdemeanors, he may
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serve his answer unverified (6 Civ. Pro. 30). In ordinary language
the word account is applied to almost every claim or contract which
°consiste of several itemis, and there isno necessity for giving any lim-
ited rmeaning to the word as it is used under section 531 (27 Hun 515).
Where an administrator sued for his con-ipensation and he was asked to
hand in a bill of particulars, it was held it did not come under this
section (4 Civ. Pro. 03), and ifthte account furnished cort ains only
the debit side, and not the credit, he can be made to furnish another
full account. (8 N.Y. St. ep. 894). "The design of 532 was evidently
to dispense with the necessity of compliance with the common law rule,
which requires a statement of facts and circumstances showing a right
to exercise jurisdiction and thus to ablreviate pleadings. The pro-
vision mentioned does not however dispense with tfte necessary proof to
establish the jurisdiction of a court of limited power." (15 N.Y. St.
Rep. 316), and it is sufficient if the facts impiedly allege jurisdic-
tion (114 N.Y. 518). Hatfield vs Lasher 81 N.Y. 246 is authority for
saying that section 535 simply changes the rules of pleading and not as
to the adirissaltility of evidnnce; and in the case of Spooner vs Keeler
51 N.Y. 538, Judge Reynolds gives a good idea of the intent of the sec-
tion;" he s ays, "Under the system of" pleading prevailing prior to the
adoption of the Code of Procedure, the defense of an action of libel an
slander was a very perilous undertaking. If the defendant attempted
to justify by proving the truth of the w:ords spoken, it was regarded as
a reiteration of the chiarge and conclusive evidence of n-P tlice, and no
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evidence in mitigation could be r,;ceived. If he failed to establish
the truth of the charge the damages were aggravated. He might give
evidence in mitigation but in that case he must adrit the truth of the
charge, and could give no evidence tending to prove the contraty. He
could only give evidence to show that he had reason to believe the
charge was true when made. It was obviously intended by t.he code to
remedy this evil and I think it has done so." The case of Cook vs
Rief 8 Civ. Pro. 133 is distinguishable from that of Fleishman vs Ben-
nett 87 Ne.Y. 237, although both seemingly to be decided on the same
point. Judge Follett in Kruikshank vs Gordon 118 N.Y. 186 gives ut-
terance to the fol]owing: "The authorization by the code of pleas in
mitigation is not a license for their interposition in bad faith, and
for the purpose of injuring the reputation of the plaintiff, and when
they are interposed for that purpose, the fact mTyay be considered by the
jury." Since the adoption o# section 537 of the code, the plaintiff
can no longer treat an answer as a nullity and enter a judgment as upon
default; his only remedy is to apply to the court or judge, upon no-
tice, as prescribed in this section. And under this section full tive
days notice must be given. The case of Singleton vs Thornton 9 N.Y.
State u ep. -600 contains a good example of a frivolous pleading. The
actioti was a promissory note and the defendants demurred to the corn-
plaint because it was not alleged they were partners, or that thle name
of "Thornton or Dobbins" is a firm or other name, an-1 that title in the
plaintiff is not alleged. In Spies vs Roberts 50 N.Y. Sup. rt. 301
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the judge held the defect in the answer did not affect the suibstantial
rights of tie parties, anrd so tey could be disregarded.
Section 542 has been the source of' considerable litigation.
Where the first w riendment to the complaint is compelled by order of
court, paintiffii may amend tqe complaint a second tirleo, ocourse, and
Without costs. The case of Robstoli vs Noxon 5 N.Y. upp. 315, held
'that a demurrer mray be regarded as an answer within the meaning of that
section, ut thte mTajority of decisions hold with the decision of PZsph
man vs Reynolds 31 N.Y. St. kep. 143, decided in another department in
which the court says: "A demurrer is not an answer in any legal sense
and cannot be amended as of course under P.542, by the service of an
answer," for sections 4t8, 499, 963 and 966 show that an answer and
demurrer are distinct and different pleadings, as they raise issues of
an entirely different nature. This decision of Cahnian vs Reynolds
was affirmed by the court of last resort. The case of vs Mayor
72 N.Y. 444, interprets section 544 in thiS. anguage: "The power of
the court to ,hich a motion is made for leave to put in a supplemental
answerer, is no more, or is it any less now than it was before the pres-
ent code. It has a discretion to permit or refuse a supplemental
pleading, but that discretion must be exercised reasonably and not ca-
priciously or wilfully." . spplenJental complaint should not be al-
lowed upon an ex-parte application ( 9 N.Y. ,%79 and 59 N.Y. 233). A
supplemental comuplaint under the code is not a substitute for the orig-
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inal coImp"-Lint but a further coryiplaint, and it assumes tli"I the origin-
al complaint is to stand (35 Hun. 553). In connection with section
546 is rule 22 w;ich req'uires that r)otions to strike out any of the
pleading matter rfor being indefinite, etc., must be noticed before de-
murring or answering the pleading, and w, ithin twenty days from the ser-
vice thereof (Brooks vs Hanchett 36 Hun.70).
This finishes a review ofl these sections, and along with
cases which we have noticed for illustration, there are many other
decisions holding the same way. This t esis has been more of a digest
tian a critical review of the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure.
than a cr(4Za!3review4o
